resources, and where the balance of power ultimately determined outcomes. Realists chastised "liberals," "legalists," and "idealists," who believe that material and military power are secondary to factors such as the form of domestic government (democratic or authoritarian), the mutual advantages of economic interdependence, the functional benefits of international institutions, and the sway of national and transnational beliefs.
Yet a funny thing happened on the way past the Cold War. While still attached to the realist label, many realists have abandoned their distinctive realpolitik precepts. International-relations scholars today are far more inclined to accept that major trends-European integration, global trade liberalization, the surprising power of small countries in limited wars such as Vietnam, the impact of human rights and environmental norms, and the spread of a "democratic peace"-are not shaped simply, or even primarily, by power. Balance-of-power calculations are often trumped by imperatives rising from economic globalization, political democratization, particular belief systems, and the role of international law and institutions.
Realists have broadened their definition of "realism" in an attempt to embrace this smorgasbord of factors. But the consequence has been conceptual incoherence. Why does the Bush administration associate itself with an academic theory that no longer seems to mean anything in particular? Aside from the chance that George W. Bush has not been keeping up with International Security, two broad possibilities stand out:
One is that "realism" gives good spin. The Properly understood, realism offers clearer answers: Reality is material power, and the national interest is to accumulate and balance that power. Yet, as was the case with its immediate predecessor, the Bush administration's global threat perception has little to do with power balancing. Where in W's world are the great powers that could tip the global balance: countries like Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Indonesia, and India? Among great powers, the administration singles out only China (with finger waving at Russia), throwing it in the rogues' clubhouse with North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Libya. These picayune foes are targeted not because they are the most powerful-or even minimally powerful-but because they are the least democratic and propagate the most hostile ideologies. This choice of adversaries unites the current administration and its predecessor against the only remaining pure "realists" in America, who tion of the Bush team is based largely on ideology, it remains skeptical of strategy and tactics not closely linked to military dominance. The two improbable pillars of the administration's policy-national missile defense (NMD) and the Powell Doctrine-are linked in this way. Other examples include the administration's commitment to NATO expansion; departure from the long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan; initial unwillingness to help broker a solution in the Middle East; a stated interest in pulling U.S. troops out of the Balkans; the discounting of the foreign public relations effects of stridently self-interested rhetoric; the slashing of funds to secure Russia's loose nukes (and loose nuclear scientists); and the president's declaration that Africa "doesn't fit into the national strategic interests."
Most striking, however, is not the Bush administration's defense of realist tactics per se, but its belief that such tactics foreclose other promising means of promoting the national interest, among them, democracy promotion, economic integra- palgrave Global Publishing atSt. Martin's Press* 1-800-221-7945 ext. 270 * www.paLgrave-usa.com
